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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
RAJ1 BARBIR,
Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.
Appellate Court #: 20030873-CA

CITY OF OREM,
Respondent/Appellee.

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

L JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
78-35a-110 and 78^2a-3(2)(f), 1953 as Amended.
IL STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Was the District Court's dismissal of the Petitioner's First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief error?
Standard of Review, The standard of review of the District Court's dismissal of the
Petitioner's First Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief is a question of law reviewed for
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's conclusion. Moench v. State of Utah,
2002 UT App 333; 57 P.3d 1116; Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT 72, 61 P.3d 978.
Issue Preserved, The issue was preserved by the Petitioner filing a Notice of Appeal

2.

Did the District Court, in dismissing the Petitioner's First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief, comply with Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure?
Standard of Review, Compliance of the District Court with Rule 65C is a question of law
reviewed for correctness with no deference to the District Court's conclusion. Moench v.
State of Utah, supra; Lancaster v. Utah Bd. Of Pardons, 869 P.2d 945 (Utah 1994).
Issue Preserved, The issue was preserved for review by the Petitioner filing a Notice of
Appeal
III. STATUTES AND RULES DETERMINATIVE OF THIS APPEAL

Utah Code Annotated, 78-35a-104, Grounds for Relief- Retroactivity of Rule. [Addendum 1]
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65C, Post-Conviction Relief. [Addendum 2]
IV. STATEMENT OF CASE

1.

Nature and Course of Proceedings, The Petitioner filed this action pursuant to Utah's
Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Annotated 78-35a-101et seq, challenging his
conviction by way of plea in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, Orem City,
before the Honorable John C. Backland, District Judge. The Petitioner challenges the
conviction on the basis of incompetency of counsel and that his plea was not voluntary. On
October 2, 2003 the court signed Findings and Order on Objection to Motion to Defendant's
Motion for Petition for Relief Under the Post-Conviction Remedies, dismissing the Petitioner's
First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief as frivolous.

2.

Statement of Relevant Facts. The facts relevant to the issues presented for review are as
follows:
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A.

That on or about May 22, 2002 the Petitioner was convicted by his plea of domestic
assault. See: Transcript Entry of Plea, Sentence R. 116. The Petitioner was
represented at the plea hearing by a Public Defender who had been appointed just
prior to the hearing. See: Affidavit of Petitioner, Raji Barbir R. 50-62.

B.

That on or prior to June 18, 2002 the Petitioner consulted with another attorney to
determine the possible consequences of the conviction on his immigration status.
The attorney informed him that he was not sure but it may have an effect upon the
Petitioner's immigration status. The Petitioner then retained the attorney on June
18, 2002 to move to withdraw the conviction. The attorney failed to make a motion,
written or otherwise, to withdraw the plea within the thirty (30) day time limit.

C.

The Petitioner filed his Petition for Relief Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, R.
1-3, on or about June 3, 2003 challenging his conviction. Although the District
Judge had not caused service to be made upon the Respondent as required by Rule
65C(h), the Respondent filed a Motion and Memorandum in Objection to Defendants
Petition for Relief Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act on June 11, 2003, R. 4-18.

D.

On August 1, 2003 the court granted the Petitioner twenty (20) days to amend his
petition and submit a list of witnesses and memorandum, R. 21-22.

E.

The Petitioner filed his First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief', R. 26-45,
[Addendum 3] together with his Memorandum in Support of Petition for PostConviction Relief\ R. 46-49, and Affidavit of Petitioner, Raji Barbir, R. 50-62,

[Addendum 4] on August 20, 2003,
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F.

On August 26, 2003 the court made a Minute Entry, R. 63-64, stating that the
Respondent had thirty (30) days from August 20, 2003 to respond to the Petitioner's
First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief md directing, "the court will enter an
order granting or denying the petition".

G.

Once again, although it had not been served pursuant to Rule 65C(h), the
Respondent, on or about September 12, 2003, filed an Amended Motion and
Memorandum in Objection to Defendant's Petition for Relief Under the Post-Conviction
Remedies Act, R. 67-76. [Addendum 5] The Orem City attorney also prepared and
submitted an Order to Summarily Dismiss the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, R. 6566.

H.

On September 29, 2003 the Respondent's attorney filed with the court and mailed a
copy to the Petitioner's attorney, Findings and Order on Objection to Defendant's Motion
for Petition for Relief Under Post-Conviction Remedies, R. 76-106. [Addendum 6]

I.

The court signed the Findings and Order on Objection to Defendant's Motion for Petition
for Relief Under Post-Conviction Remedies on or about October 2, 2003, summarily
dismissing the Petitioner's First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief without
notice to the Petitioner's attorney or a hearing.
V, SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1.

The Petitioner's First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief stated sufficient facts to
support a cause of action for post-conviction relief. The First Amended Petition for PostConviction Relief allegations makes a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The
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facts alleged also support a prima facie case that the Petitioner's plea was not voluntary, the
requirements of Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11 having not been met.
The court in making its determination that, "Petitioner's claims appear frivolous on its face,
the facts alleged in the petition do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law, and/or have
no arguable basis in fact", is based on an assessment of the merits of the Petitioner's claims in
violation of Rule 65C(g) (1). Moench v. State of Utah, supra. The court's summary dismissal
of the Petitioner's First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief without a hearing was
contrary to Rule 65C.
That the District Court improperly allowed the Respondent to file its Amended Motion and
Memorandum in Objection to Defendant's Petition for Relief Under the Post-Conviction Remedies
Act and signed the Findings and Order on Objection to Motion to Defendant's Motion for Petition
for Relief Under the Post-Conviction Remedies submitted therewith, contrary to the procedure
specified by Rule 65C.
VL ARGUMENT

The First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief states a cause of action to vacate the
Petitioner's conviction under Utah Code Annotated, 78-35a-104.
Utah Code Annotated, 78-35a404(l)(a) grants the District Court jurisdiction to vacate a
criminal conviction obtained in violation of the United States Constitution or the Utah
Constitution. The Petitioner's plea, in order to be constitutionally acceptable, must have been
made voluntarily with knowledge and understanding of the nature and elements of the crime
to which he was pleading. Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11, places the burden on
the Trial Court to verify that the plea is voluntary. The Petitioner's First Amended Petition for
5

Post-Conviction Relief and the supporting Affidavit of the Petitioner, Raji Barbir with the attached
Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel, establishes that Rule
11 was not complied with- The Petitioner was not informed of the nature and elements of the
crime. This allegation constitutes a prima facie claim that the plea was not voluntary and that
the requirements of Rule 11 were not met. Moench v. State of Utah, supra.
Utah Code Annotated 78-35a-104(l)(d) also provides for relief where, "the Petitioner had
ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah
Constitution."

The First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and the Affidavit of

Petitioner, Raji Barbir, allege failure of counsel to properly investigate, failure to inform the
Petitioner of possible defenses and strategies, and failure to file a timely Motion to Withdraw
the Plea-, each allegation constitutes a basis to establish, "that counsel's performance fell below
an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, thereby prejudicing him."
Moench v. State of Utah, supra. The allegations of the First Amended Petition for PostConviction Relief on their face made a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
After advising the Petitioner that his immigration status may be effected by the conviction,
the second attorney surely should have filed a motion to withdraw the plea before the thirty
(30) day time limit expired. State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT App 203, 73P.3d 967.
2.

The District Court's dismissal of the Petition as frivolous on its face was based on a
consideration of the underlying merits of the Petitioner's claim.

6

This Court has held in Moench v. State of Utah, supra, that when a petition is filed pursuant
to Rule 65C, "the trial court's sole responsibility is to determine whether the petition is
frivolous on its face." Rule 65C(g) states:
"Summary dismissal of claims. The assigned judge shall review the petition, and,
if it is apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated in a prior
proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its face, the
court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating either that the
claim has been adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its face. The order
shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall
terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal need
not recite findings of fact or conclusions of law."
Moench v. State of Utah, supra, holds that the District Court's determination must be limited
to a facial review of the petition and cannot be based on an evaluation of the merits of the
petitioner's factual claim.
In this case, a reading of the Court's twenty-seven (27) page Findings and Order on Objection
to Motion to Defendant's Motion for Petition for Relief Under the Post-Conviction Remedies, R. 77106 which compels the conclusion that the District Court, like the Court in Moench v. State
ofUtah, supra, went well beyond a facial consideration of the Petition and addressed the merits
of the Petitioner's claims. The Court states a number of facts which go beyond and dispute
the facts in the First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and the Affidavit of the
Petitioner, Raji Barbir. Many of those facts are not supported by the record. An example is the
claim in paragraph (0 on page 2 of the Findings and Order on Objection to Motion to Defendant's
Motion for Petition for Relief Under the Post-Conviction Remedies, R. 78. The Court did not ask
the defendant if he read and understood the statement of rights in support of his guilty plea,
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and asked if he knowingly or voluntarily was waiving those rights. See: Transcript Entry of
Pleas, Sentence, page 3, lines 18-24, R. 116
The Court's 145 Conclusions of Law also compels a determination that the Court considered
the merits of the Petitioner's claims, contrary to the requirements of Rule 65C.
3.

The District Court allowed the Respondent to file the Amended Motion and Memorandum in
Objection to Defendant's Petition for Relief under the Post Conviction Remedies Act contrary to the
procedural requirements of Rule 65C.
Rule 65C provides that after the Court's facial determination of the petition, if it is not
dismissed as frivolous, then and only then should service of the petition be made on the
Respondent and the Respondent may respond as required in Rule 65C(i) which states as
follows:
"Answer or other response. Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these rules
for service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition upon the respondent,
or within such other period of time as the court may allow, the respondent
shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition that have not
been dismissed and shal 1 serv e the answer or other response upon the
petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within 30 days (plus time allowed
for service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for summary
judgment, the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the motion. No
further pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered by the
court."
Even if it was appropriate for the District Court to consider the Respondent's Motion, the
District Court did not allow the Petitioner its thirty (30) clays to respond as required by Rule
65C.
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VIL

CONCLUSION

This Court should reverse the District Court's Findings and Order on Objection to Motion to
Defendant's Motion for Petition for Relief Under the Post-Conviction Remedies dismissing the First
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, The case should be remanded to the District Court with
direction to withdraw the Petitioner's guilty plea and vacate the conviction. In the alternative, the
case should be remanded to the District Court with directions to allow a hearing on the Petitioner's
evidence and to make a determination on the Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim and
determine if the plea was made knowingly and voluntarily.
DATED this 29th day of April, 2004.

102 South 100 West
P.O. Box 461
Brigham City, UT 84302

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing document to:
Justin Johanson
Attorney for the Appellee
56 North State Street
Orem,UT 84057
DATED this 29th day of April, 2004.

Addenda

Addendum 1

78-35a-104. Grounds for relief- Retroactivity
of rule.
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78-35a-106 or 78-35a-107, a person who has been convicted
and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the district court of original jurisdiction
for post-conviction relief to vacate or modify the conviction or sentence upon the following
grounds:
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of the United States
Constitution or Utah Constitution;
(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that is in violation of the United States
Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which the petitioner was prosecuted is
constitutionally protected;
(c) the sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner, or probation was revoked in an unlawful
manner;
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the United States
Constitution or Utah Constitution; or
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to vacate the conviction or
sentence, because:
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the time of trial or
sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion or postconviction proceeding, and the evidence could not have been discovered tlirough the exercise of
reasonable diligence;
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known;
(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material evidence demonstrates that
no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to the
sentence received.
(2) The question of whether a petitioner is entitled to the benefit of a rule announced by the
United States Supreme Court, Utah Supreme Court, or Utah Court of Appeals after the
petitioner's conviction became final shall be governed by applicable state and federal principles
of retroactivity.

Addendum 2

Rule 65C. Post-conviction relief.
(a) Scope. This rule shall govern proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief filed
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 et seq., Post-Conviction Remedies Act.
(b) Commencement and venue. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the district
court in the county in which the judgment of conviction was entered. The petition should be filed on forms provided
by the court. The court may order a change of venue on its own motion if the petition is filed in the wrong county.
The court may order a change of venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the parties or witnesses.
(c) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the petitioner has in relation to the legality of
the conviction or sentence. Additional claims relating to the legality of the conviction or sentence may not be raised
in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown. The petition shall state:
(c)(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place of incarceration;
(c)(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced and the dates of proceedings in
which the conviction was entered, together with the court's case number for those proceedings, if known by the
petitioner;
(c)(3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the petitioner's claim to relief;
(c)(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for violation of probation has been
reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and title of the appellate proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the
results of the appeal;
(c)(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated in any prior post-conviction or other
civil proceeding, and, if so, the case number and title of those proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and the
results of the prior proceeding; and
(c)(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered evidence, the reasons why the evidence
could not have been discovered in time for the claim to be addressed in the trial, the appeal, or any previous postconviction petition.
(d) Attachments to the petition. If available to the petitioner, the petitioner shall attach to the petition:
(d)(1) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the allegations;
(d)(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court regarding the direct appeal of the petitioner's
case;
(d)(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding that
adjudicated the legality of the conviction or sentence; and
(d)(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court.
(e) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or discuss authorities in the
petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed with the petition.
(i) Assignment. On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign and deliver it to the judge who sentenced
the petitioner. If the judge who sentenced the petitioner is not available, the clerk shall assign the case in the normal
course.

(g) Summary dismissal of claims. The assigned judge shall review the petition, and, if it is apparent to the court that
any claim has been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its face, the
court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating either that the claim has been adjudicated or that the
claim is frivolous on its face. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall
terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or
conclusions of law.
(g)(2) A petition is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations contained in the pleadings and
attachments, it appears that:
(g)(2)(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law;
(g)(2)(B) the claims have no arguable basis in fact; or
(g)(2)(C) the petition challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired prior to the filing of the petition.
(g)(3) If a petition is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading error or failure to comply with the
requirements of this rule, the court shall return a copy of the petition with leave to amend within 20 days. The court
may grant one additional 20 day period to amend for good cause shown.
(g)(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial post-conviction petition in a case where the
petitioner is sentenced to death.
(h) Service ofpetitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all or part of the petition should not be
summarily dismissed, the court shall designate the portions of the petition that are not dismissed and direct the clerk
to serve a copy of the petition, attachments and memorandum by mail upon the respondent. If the petition is a
challenge to a felony conviction or sentence, the respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney General.
In all other cases, the respondent is the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner.
(i) Answer or other response. Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these rules for service by mail) after service
of a copy of the petition upon the respondent, or within such other period of time as the court may allow, the
respondent shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition that have not been dismissed and shall
serve the answer or other response upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within 30 days (plus time
allowed for service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, the petitioner may
respond by memorandum to the motion. No further pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered by the
court.
(j) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the proceeding for a hearing or otherwise
dispose of the case. The court may also order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not be set so as to
delay unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the petition. At the prehearing conference, the court may:
(j)(l) consider the formation and simplification of issues;
(j)(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents; and
(j)(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to be presented at the evidentiary
hearing.
(k) Presence of the petitioner at hearings. The petitioner shall be present at the prehearing conference if the
petitioner is not represented by counsel. The prehearing conference may be conducted by means of telephone or
video conferencing. The petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not
otherwise be present in court during the proceeding. The court may conduct any hearing at the correctional facility
where the petitioner is confined.
(1) Discovery; records. Discovery under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed by the court upon motion of a party
and a determination that there is good cause to believe that discovery is necessary to provide a party with evidence

that is likely to be admissible at an evidentiary hearing. The court may order either the petitioner or the respondent to
obtain any relevant transcript or court records.
(m) Orders; stay.
(m)(l) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter findings of fact and conclusions of law
and an appropriate order. If the petitioner is serving a sentence for a felony conviction, the order shall be stayed for 5
days. Within the stay period, the respondent shall give written notice to the court and the petitioner that the
respondent will pursue a new trial, pursue a new sentence, appeal the order, or take no action. Thereafter the stay of
the order is governed by these rules and by the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
(m)(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will be taken, the stay shall expire and
the court shall deliver forthwith to the custodian of the petitioner the order to release the petitioner.
(m)(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or resentenced, the trial court may enter any
supplementary orders as to arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that may be
necessary and proper.
(n) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems
appropriate. If the petitioner is indigent, the court may direct the costs to be paid by the governmental entity that
prosecuted the petitioner. If the petitioner is in the custody of the Department of Corrections, Section 64-13-23 and
sections 21-7-3 through 21-7-4.7 govern the manner and procedure by which the trial court shall determine the
amount, if any, to charge for fees and costs.
(o) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be appealed to and reviewed by the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those courts.

Addendum 3

Jack H. Molgard #2290
Attorney at Law
102 South 100 West
P.O. Box461
Brigham City, UT 84302
(435) 723-8569

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
OREM MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT
RAJI BARBIR,

)
Petitioner,

FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR
POST CONVICTION RELIEF

)
)

vs.

)

CASE#:

030200989 RN

)

Judge:

John C. Backhaul

OREM CITY,
Respondent.

v

\

COMES NOW the Petitioner and files this First Amended Petition for Relief Under the PostConviction Remedies Act pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-35a 101, et scq. and Rule 65C, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, and in support thereof states as follows:
1.

That on or about May 22, 2002, the Petitioner, RAJI BARBIR, was convicted by his plea in
the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, Orcm Municipal Department, the
Honorable John C. Backlund, District Judge presiding, of the crime of simple assault in the
case of Orcm City vs. Raji Barbir, case number 021200881. That attached hereto, marked
Exhibit "A" and by reference made a part hereof, is a true and correct copy of the docket of
said proceedings of Petitioner's conviction.

03014\Petnioi\AmendI upd

2.

That at the time the Petitioner entered the referred to plea of guilty, the Petitioner had not
had a reasonable time to confer with counsel. That the Petitioner had been incarcerated and
counsel had been appointed just prior to the Court proceeding.

3.

That the Petitioner had no previous knowledge of the nature of the Court proceedings or the
elements of the crimes of which he was charged. The Petitioner was not aware of possible
defenses to said crimes. Further, the Petitioner was not aware of the fact that his wife, who
was the principal witness against him, could not be compelled to be a witness against him if
she declined to testify. The Petitioner was not aware of, nor was he informed of the possible
defense strategies, such as 'seeking a plea in abeyance', or the different consequences between
a domestic assault and an interruption of a communication device. The Petitioner was not
informed or aware of possible consequences of his plea, such as to his immigration status.

4.

That the Court did not verbally inform the Petitioner of his Constitutional Rights, and the
Petitioner was presented with a partially completed Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty
Plea and Certificate of Counsel a true and correct of which is attached hereto, marked Exhibit
"B" and by reference made a part hereof. That although the Petitioner signed the partially
completed form, he had not completely read nor understood all of the six-page form and
further, the Petitioner did not fully understand the content of said form.

5.

That the Petitioner did not understand and apparently was not informed of the elements of
the crimes of which he was charged and further, said elements were not set forth in Exhibit
"B".

6.

That the Petitioner is not presently incarcerated.

7.

That the judgment of conviction and sentence has not been reviewed on appeal.

8.

That the legality of the conviction and sentence has not been adjudicated in any prior postconviction or other civil proceeding.

9.

That on or prior to June 18, 2002, the Petitioner contacted Attorney Paul Kawai regarding
his conviction and its possible consequences, particularly on his immigration status. Attorney

Kawai informed the Petitioner that he was not sure, but it may effect the Petitioner's
immigration status. That the Petitioner retained Attorney Paul Kawai on the above-referred

0J0l4\PctitionAmciitll.wp«J
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to date to move to withdraw the conviction. Attorney Kawai failed to make a written Motion
to Withdraw the Plea within the thirty-day time limit for such motions.
10.

That at a subsequent hearing, the Petitioner appeared with his counsel, Attorney Paul Kawai,
and discussed withdrawal of his plea with the Court and a possible agreement with the
prosecuting attorney for a plea-itvabeyance, but counsel had failed to make a written request
and failed to appeal any decisions of the Court. That attached hereto is a true and correct
copy of the docket of said hearing marked as Exhibit "C" and by reference made a part
hereof.

11.

That the Petitioner's plea and conviction and his failure to properly move to withdraw the
plea or file an appeal were a result of ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of his
Constitutional Rights under the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Utah.

12.

That counsel, prior to the Petitioner's plea, failed to properly investigate the Petitioner's case,
failed to consider and advise the Petitioner of the consequences of making an immediate plea
rather than taking the necessary time to ensure that the prosecution could, and in fact would,
convict the Petitioner, and to consider and assert all of the Petitioner's defenses. Counsel
also failed to advise the Petitioner of the possible consequences of the plea and its effect on
his immigration status.

13.

That the Petitioner's counsel failed to bring a proper motion to withdraw the Petitioner's plea
and/or appeal the Petitioner's conviction.

14.

Upon information and belief it is alleged that the City of Orcm failed to provide adequate
counsel to the Petitioner because of its refusal to pay an adequate amount for legal services
to defend the Petitioner properly in the referred to criminal proceedings.

15.

That the offense of which the Petitioner was convicted is a deportable offense under the
Immigration and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C. 1227], see Exhibit "D" attached hereto and by
reference made a part hereof. That if the Petitioner, who is a resident alien, had been
advised of the effect on his immigration status he would not have entered a plea of guilty.

03014\PetitionAmend 1 .wpd
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16.

That attached hereto, marked Exhibit "E" and by reference made a part hereof, is the
Affidavit of the Petitioner, RAJI BAR13IR, in support of this Petition.
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner prays judgment vacating the Petitioner's conviction referred

to above and for such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and equitable in the
premises.
DATED this 19th day of August, 2003.

Raji Barbir,~cz
Petitioner

Attorney for the Petitioner
102 South 100 West
P.O. Box 461
Brigham City, UT 84302
STATE OF UTAH

)

: ss.
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER )
I, the undersigned Petitioner, declare under penalty of perjury that the information I have
provided in this Petition is true and correct.
DATED this 19th day of August, 2003.

Raji Barbir

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 19th day ofAugust, 2003
' ^ • ^ i t ^ . M ^

JACK. H MOLGARD
Notary p u N J C
>Sfaf« 0 r (Jieh

LMsw&a?.^Ul i ^ d ^ r y Public
«S!£&» *
03014\Pi?ririun Amend I -wod
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to:
Justin Johanson
Orem City Prosecutor
56 North State Street
Orem.UT 84057

DATED this 19th day of August, 2003.

Ail-as

uiiM-'it

Secretary

r

Exhibit "A"

UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTME,, f
97 East C e n t e r , O r e n i , Utah 8 4 0 5 7
(801)764-5865
'/STATE v s j _f e f l \j |
tJDRESS VERIFIED
v/
_yV)
V)
v
)
)
)
)
_)
J
J
)

6 f r . V P i r

CASE#
JUDGE

± amLijsJ^-

3^

TIME
TAPE
COUNTER

u4fe
33
zs

"7
DATE , 1
CLERK
/•/)/[

in-

41

Defendant present (
) pro se
( ^ ) with counsel
Prosecutor
Defendant given information ( v/ ) Read
(
) Reading Waived.
(' v ' ) Advised of Rights and Penalties
Defendant acknowledged (s) he understands rights and penalties. (
) Given 2nd and 3rd Offense Warning in Open Court
COUNSEL APPOINTED. SEE REVERSE SIDE. (
) Request for counsel denied. /
RELEASE DEFENDANT R O R . ( V ) Defendant in custody of (
(Sheriff
( ^ )OPD
(
) Other
BAIL SET AT $
Cash / Bond / Surety.
(
) Remand into custody of

Defendant failed to appear.
(
) Warrant with bail at $
Cash / Bond / Surety.
Non-Bailable Warrant in Aid of Commitment for
days / months. Review after
days.
( ) No Review
FORFEIT BAIL BOND. (
) FORFEIT CASH BAIL. (
) FORFEIT IN DISPOSITION. (
) FORFEIT FOR FTA.
(
) SODC
Defendant found Non-Compliant. Probation is revoked and terminated

OUNT1

OUNT2

lA/fl W U 4 - T .

I \\\\\

I ( {^,K~\Jc:\J^tC

Plea

v

U l

Plea

\")\

,\\\

COUNT 4
COUNT 5
COUNT 6
(
) accepted after factual basis given.

1-800-642-351

Plea.
Plea
Plea

OUNT3
;
Plea
lea entered by
( V ) defendant
(
) defense counsel (
\ court
ENTENCINQ;
) Defense waived right to timely imposition of sentence. (
) Defendant requested time for EOP / Sentence
Imposed
Imposed
, j -STuspejidejj
OUNT1 Fine of.
and jail of
L
| n {{ if)
day:
OUNT 2 Fine of
and jail of
day,
OUNT 3 Fine of
and jail of
day:
OUNT 4 Fine of
and jail of
day:
(
) Credit for time serve(
SUSPENSIONS ARE CONTINGENT UPON DEFENDANTS,COMPLIANCE WITH THIS QRPER
FINE and FEES PLUS INTERESTdue by Of . f < v ' ( j / _
.
RESTITUTION due by
.(
) Court reserves jurisdiction regarding restitution.
ine and fees to be paid
(
) to the clerk of court
) as directed by Adult Probation.
(
) Defendant to make moplhlyj^yments of $
beginning _
and continuing until paid in full
ROTATION
Sjfr
SjEE R E V E R s F s i p E ^ )
) Unsupervised
( v/> Intervention
Defendant is on probafionlor
/ ^Xmonths (
)AP&P
Report to Adult Probation for Pre-Senlence Report by
) CALL INTERVENTION WITHIN 24 HOURS OF SENTENCING
(
) GO TO POLICE DEPARTMENT FOR PROCESSING
LCQHQL/DRUG TREATMENT
SEE REVERSE SIDE
) Defendant is ordered to pay $
Alcohol Education Fee by
BAC
) Defendant is ORDERED TO TAKE THIS FORM and REPORT to the UTAH COUNTY DIVISION OF HUMAN SERVICES.
/lK_K:j(
) Complete Alcohol / Substance Abuse / Domestic Violence Evaluation by
/
LJ
) Anger Management Class through UVSC (764-7580)
(
) Life Skills/Class through UVSC
( V ) Contact DCFS (374-7898)
) Provide proof of completion to court (
) Continue present counseling ( v / ) Treatment as Ordered (
) Court reserves jurisdiction over treatmer
) Pay Utah County Division of Human Services directly for evaluation / classes /Alcohol Education Fee.
) STATE FUND to pay for evaluation / classes
) submit to blood / urine / drug / alcohol tests.
'efendant to (
) have no drug / alcohol related charges (
) use no alcohol or controlled substances (
(
) Not associate with anyone using controlled substance or paraphernalia

-f

.•iMJfT^

w

ffi

QRPER; fPPlI WUhln One WeeK T? Schgdufe Ja|l Time),
Report lo the UTAH COUNTY JAIL and serve.
) Work
Work Search.
\ Work Diversion Program ( y ) Work Release. (
/
)
Days Home Confinement through INTERVENTION (SEE REVERSE SIDE).
) To be completed by
in
hours increments. Defendant Pfione U
ail to be served (
) CONCURRENT (
) CONSECUTIVE TO ANY OTHER CASE. Defendant to provide proof of completion.
IMMUNITY SERVICE
SEE REVERSE SIDE
) Community service granted. Defendant to complete
hours in lieu of fine / jail by
counter for referral. Defendant to provide proof of completion. (
) Serve Through United Way - 374-2588

2fl_<*.* O-flAi ('V/f/Z-/ 'V» ! <ria.
•j'

Do 1 M p q f l \ 4 u ^

U^_Ln4W
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J NO CONTACT WITH VICTIMS

IEARING SCHEDULE IN OPEN COURT:

.) PROTECTIVE ORDER SERVED ON DEFENDANT
on

at

.W

Exhibit "B"

IN TIT1C

I'uUKTii
UTAH

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
. COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

CITY OF OREM

Plaintiff,

Case No.

\s.
Kclj, fct^-J,,
Defendant.

_, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been
I> flfij I
(1*-^^
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights:
Notification of Charges
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes:
Degree

Crime & Statutory
Provision
A*

Av>^u^h fah>^>k^ l/iik"**

B.

C.

D.

1

Punishment
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory

T have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or
had it read to me, and I understand (he nature and the elements of crime(s) to which T ^m
pleadmg guilty (or no contest).
Tlie elements of tlie crime(s) to wliich I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are:

I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes
listed above. (Or, if I am pleadmg no contest, I am not contesting that I committed tlie
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty
(or no contest) pleas and prove tlie elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty
(or no contest):

Waiver of Constitutional Rights
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have tlie following rights
under the constitutions of Utah and of tlie United States. I also understand that if I plead
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the 'following rights:
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by tlie court at no cost to me. I understand

9

that I might later, if die judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the
appointed lawyer's service to me.
1 (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel,
I have clone so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following leasons:

If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and tliat
I understand the nature and elements of tlie charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty
(or no contest). I also undeistand my rights in this case and other cases and the
consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s).
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is
.
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of
my guilty (or no contest) plea(s).
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest).
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have
a jury trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against
me and b) my atlorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the
opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me.
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call
witnesses ifI chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and
testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, tlie
State would pay those costs.
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to
have a jury trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I
chose not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself.
I also know that if I chose not to testify, tlie jury would be told that they could not hold my
refusal to testify against me.
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead
guilty (or no contest), I am presumed innocent until thebaic proves that I am guilty of the
charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need oidy plead "not guilty,"
and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, tlie State would have the burden of proving

1

each clement of (he chargc(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jiuy, the
verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand tliat if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above.
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or
judge, I would have Hie right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest).
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all
the statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know tliat by pleading guilty (or no
contest) to a crime tliat carries a mandatory penally, I will be subjecting myself to serving
a mandatory penalty for tliat crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or
both.
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges tliat are dismissed as part of
a plea agreement
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know tliat if there is more than one crime
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run
at the same time (concurrently). I know tliat I may be charged an additional fine for each
crime that I plead to. I also know tliat if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing
on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no
contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was
imprisoned or on parole, I know Hie law requires Hie court to impose consecutive sentences
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be
inappropriate.
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Pica bargain. My guilty (or no contest) plca(s) (is/arc) (is/nro not) llio mull < >fa pica
bargain bclwccn myself mill |||« pi^cculiug attorney.. All Uic promises, duties, and
provisions of Uic plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including tliose
explained below:

Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not
binding on the judge. I also know Uiat any opinions they express to me as to what they
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge.
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness
I am entering Uiis plea of my own free will and choice. No force, tlireats, of unlawful
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises
except tliose contained in this statement have been made to me.
I have read tliis statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes
because all of Uie statements are correct
I am satisfied wiUi the advice and assistance of my attorney.
I am
years of age. I have attended school through the
grade. I can read
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants
which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under
the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of
understanding Uiese proceedings and Uie consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing
orfromknowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.
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I understand (Iia t if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I m i l s t
file a writ ten motion to withdraw my plca(s) within 30 days a ffer I have been sen (mnfi
and final judgment has been entered* 1 will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I
show good cause. I will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after 30 days for any
reason.
Dated this 22=, day of

\Mc\K\

, 2QrO.

DEF

Certificate of Defense Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for
, the defendant
:
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its
contents and is mentally and physically competent To the best ofmy knowledge and belief,
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are
accurate and true.

jfl^A?.^
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
Bar No. ?fr*-3

K

Order
Based on Uie facts set forlli in the foregoing Statement and the certification of Uie
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representaUons in court, Uie Court witnesses
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely,
knowingly, and voluntarily made.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Uie defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to tlie
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered.

Exhibit "C"
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TAPE

97 East Center, Orem, Utah 84057
j

(801)764-5865

:iTY/3TATE vs__
DDRESS VERIFI
3
J
_)
J
J
J

CASE*
JUDGE

COUNTER

fo/.A-'-.'A1/

DATE
. CLERK_

TZ\

h>

LdUttl

Defendant present (
) pro se
( C-^wlth counsel
Prosecutor
(
) Reading Waived
Defendant given information (
) Read
(
) Advised of Rights and Penalties
Defendant acknowledged (s) he understands rights and penalties (
) Given 2nd and 3rd Offense Warning in Open Court
COUNSEL APPOINTED SEE REVERSE SIDE (
) Request for counsel domed
RELEASE DEFENDANT ROR
(
) Defendant in custody of (
) Sheriff
(
) OPD
(
) Other
BAIL SET AT $ .
Cash / Bond / Surety
(
) Remand into custody of

,—J c

,_

(luvuA

J Defendant failed to appear
(
) Warrant with bad at $
Cash / Bond / Surety
J Non Bailable Warrant in Aid of Commitment for
days / months Review after
days
( ) No Review
J FORFEIT BAIL BOND (
) FORFEIT CASH BAIL (
) FORFEIT IN DISPOSITION (
) FORFEIT FOR FTA
(
) SODC
1 800 642 35
J Defendant found Non Compliant Probnhon is revoked and terminated
ARRAIGNMENT:
*
COUNT 1
Plea.
COUNT 4
Plea.
h4.'..V
COUNT 2
Plea
COUNT 5
Plea
COUNT 3
Plea
COUNT 6
Plea
(
) accepted after factual basis given
Plea entered by
(
) defendant
(
) defense counsel (
) court
SENTENCING:
(
) Defense waived right to timely imposition of sentence (
) Defendant requested time for EOP / Sentence
Imposed
Suspended
Imposed
Suspended
COUNT 1 Fine of
/
da
/
and jail of
COUNT 2 Fine of
/
and jail of
/
da
COUNT 3 Fine of
/
and jail of
/
da
COUNT 4 Fine of
da
/
_
and jail of _
_
__
/
(
) Credit for time serv<
SUSPENSIONS ARE CONTINGENT UPON DEFENDANT'S COMPLIANCE WITH THIS ORDER
FINE and FEES PLUS INTERESTdue by
RESTITUTION due by
(
) Court reserves jurisdiction regarding restitution
Fine and fees to be paid
(
) to the clerk of court
(
) as directed by Adult Probation
and continuing until paid in fu
(
) Defendant to make monthly payments of $
beginning
PROBATION
SEE REVERSE SIDE
months (
) Unsupervised
(
) Intervention
(
) AP & P
) Defendant is on probation for
__) Report to Adult Probation for Pre-Sentence Report by
(
) CALL INTERVENTION WITHIN 24 HOURS OF SENTENCING
(
) GO TO POLICE DEPARTMENT FOR PROCESSING
ALCOHOL / DRUG TREATMENT
SEE REVERSE SIDE
) Defendant is ordered to pay $
Alcohol Education Fee by
BAC
_ J Defendant is ORDERED TO TAKE THIS FORM and REPORT lo the UTAH COUNTY DIVISION OF HUMAN SERVICES
) Complete Alcohol / Substance Abuse / Domestic Violence Evaluation by
) Contact DCFS (374-7898)
__) Anger Management Class through UVSC (764-7580)
(
) Life Skills Class through UVSC
(
) Court reserves jurisdiction over treatm
__) Provide proof of completion to court (
) Continue present counseling (
) Treatment as Ordered (
) Pay Utah County Division of Human Services directly for evaluation / classes / Alcohol Education Fee
) STATE FUND to pay for evaluation / classes
) submit to blood / urine / drug / alcohol tests
Defendant to (
) have no drug/alcohol related charges (
) use no alcohol or controlled substances (
(
) Not associate with anyone usrng controlled substance or paraphernalia

T

JAIL ORDER: (Call Within One Week To Schedule Jail Time).
(
) Report to the UTAH COUNTY JAIL and serve
days by
(
\ Work Diversion Program (
) Work Release
(
) Work Search
(
)
Days Home Confinement through INTERVENTION (SEE REVERSE SIDE).
(
) To be completed by
in
hours increments Defendant Phone #
Jail to be served (
) CONCURRENT (
) CONSECUTIVE TO ANY OTHER CASE
Defendant to provide proof of completion
COMMUNITY SERVICE
SEE REVERSE SIDE
hours in lieu of fine / jail by
(
) Community service granted Defendant to complete
) Serve Through United Way 374 2588
(
) Go to counter for referral Defendant to provide proof of completion (
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.) PROTECTIVE ORDER SERVED ON DEFENDANT

HEARING SCHEDULE IN OPEN COURT
at
on
I HEREBY PROMISE TO APPEAR for the above entitled hearing I realize that if I fail to appear, the Court may proceed in my absence and a warrant may issi
npfnnrl

Exhibit "D"

IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT

§ 237<«)<3KCM0
[8 U S C U227J

(E) Cnnies of Domestic violence, stalking, or violation of piotection Oidei, cruiies
against Children and —
Vi) Domestic^violence, s'alkmg, and cbila abuse—Any alien who at anv time alter
enuV id cofiviclec) ot a entile of domestic violence, a crime oi stalking, o r a crime oJ
child abuse, rhild neglect, or child abandonment is deportable For purposes of this
elause The term 'crime of domestic violence" means any ciime of violence (as de
fined ui section 16 of title 18 United States Code) against a person committed b) a
current or former spouse of the person, by. an individual with whom the person
share* ? child in common, by an individual who is cohabiting with o~ has cohabited
with the person as a spouse, by an individual similarly situated to a spouse cf the
person imder the domestic or family violence law? of die jurisdiction where the offense occurs or bv any other individual against a person who is protected from tint
individual's acts under me domestic or family violence laws ot the United States or
any State, Indian tribal government, oi unit oflocal government
(1FJ Violators of piolution oidcrs—Any alien who at anv tune after entry is
enjoined under a piotection order issued by a court and whom the court determines
has engaged in conduct that violates the portion of a protection order that involves
protection against credible ducats of violence iepeated harassment, < r bodily injury
f
o the person or persons for whom the protection order was issued is deportable For
purposes of this clause, the tenn * protection order" means any injunction issued toi
the purpose of preventing violent or threatening acts of domestic violence, including
temporary or final orders issued by civil or criminal courts (other than support or
child custody orders or piovisions) whether obtained by filing an independent action or as a pendente lite order ui another proceeding
(3)d ailure lo register and falsification of documents, —
0\) Change of address—An^abe^wjio has faded to comply with die piovisions of
section 2bS is deportable, unless the alien establishes to trie satisfaction of the Attorney
General that such failure was reasonably excusable.orwas not willful
(B) Failure to register or falsification of documents —Any alien who at zny time lias
been convicted—
Tfy under section 266(c) of Ibis Act or under section 36f<) of the Alien Registration
Act, 1940.
{ft) of a violation of, or an attempt or a conspuacy to violate, anv provision ol die
Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1933 (22 U b v, 6 i ' cf scq ;, oi
(if*) of a violation of or an attempt or a conspiracy to violate, sisUiun 15*^6 oi title
18, United States Code ^rel iting *c .fraud and misuse of visis, per nuts, and oth< r en
tr> dovuments), is deportable
(C) Document fraud
0) In general

An alien who is tne subject of a iinal order for violation of section

2/4C is deportable.

'5Addc<3 b> §3:0of IRA1RA effective for f con/itti<m orviolttions ;fcoirt orders, occumnfjpflrr llic dale ri nw in ert ui
[HRAIRA]'
*Amendec by 5345(b> of iiRAIRA, dTective en the date of c lac&r ert dflJR/ JK A

[March 20Q2J
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Exhibit "E"

Jack H. Molgard #2290
Attorney at Law
102 South 100 West
P.O. Box 461
Brigham City, UT 84302
(435) 723-8569

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
OREM MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT
RAJIBARBIR,

)
Petitioner,

vs.

)
)

OREM CITY,
Respondent.

STATE OF UTAH

AFFIDAVIT OF PETITIONER,
RAJI BARBIR

)

CASE#:

030200989 RN

)

Judge:

John C. Backhaul

)
: ss.

COUNTY OF BOX ELDER )
I, RAJI BARBIR, being first duly sworn deposes and says:
1.

That at the time I entered the plea of guilty in the above-referred to matter, I had not had
a reasonable time to confer with counsel. That I had been incarcerated and counsel was
appointed to represent me just prior to the Court proceeding.

2.

1 had no previous knowledge of the nature of the Court proceedings or the elements of the
crimes of which I had been charged. I was not aware of possible defenses to said crimes.
Further, I was not aware of the fact that my wife, who was the principal witness against me,
could not be compelled to be a witness against me if she declined to testify. I was not aware
of, nor was I informed of the possible defense strategies such as to 'seeking a plea in abeyance'

or the different consequences of pleading to a domestic assault rather than to interruption

OJOIMffidavit.wpd

of a communication device, I was not informed nor was I aware of the possible consequences
of my plea, such as its effect on my immigration status.
3.

The Court did not verbally inform me of my Constitutional Rights. I was presented with a
partially completed Statement of Defendant in Su^ort of Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel,
a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto, marked Exhibit "13" and by reference
made a part hereof; although I signed the partially completed form, 1 had not completely
read nor understood all of the six-page form, and I did not fully understand the content of
said form.

4.

I did not understand and I don't recall being informed of the elements of the crimes of which
I was charged and further, the elements were not set forth in Exhibit "B".

5.

That on or prior to June 18, 2002,1 contacted Attorney Paul Kavvai regarding my conviction
and its possible consequences, particularly on my immigration status. Attorney Kawai
informed me that he was not sure, but it may affect my immigration status. I retained
Attorney Paul Kavvai on or about June 18, 2002, to advise and represent me and to move to
withdraw my conviction. Attorney Paul Kavvai foiled to make a written Motion to Withdraw
the Guilty Plea within the required thirty-day period.

6.

That the offense of which I was convicted is a deportable offense under the Immigration and
Nationality Act [8 U.S.C. 1227], sec Exhibit "C" attached hereto and by reference made a
part hereof. I am a resident alien and if 1 had been advised that my conviction would be a
deportable offense, 1 would not have entered a plea of guilty.
DATED this 19th day of August, 2003.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to:
Justin Johanson
Orem City Prosecutor
56 North State Street
Orem,UT 84057
DATED this 19,h day of August, 2003.

/ •
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Addendum 4

Jack H. Molgard #2290
Attorney at Law
102 South 100 West
P.O. Box461
Brigham City, UT 84302
(435) 723-8569

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
OREM MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT
RAJI BARBIR,

)

AFFIDAVIT OF PETITIONER,
RAJI BARBIR

Petitioner,
vs.
OREM CITY,
Respondent.
STATE OF UTAH

CASE#:

030200989 RN

Judge:

John C. Backlund

)

COUNTY OF BOX ELDER )

ss.

I, RAJI BARBIR, being first duly sworn deposes and says:
1.

That at the time I entered the plea of guilty in the above-referred to matter, I had not had
a reasonable time to confer with counsel. That I had been incarcerated and counsel was
appointed to represent me just prior to the Court proceeding.

2.

I had no previous knowledge of the nature of the Court proceedings or the elements of the
crimes of which I had been charged. I was not aware of possible defenses to said crimes.
Further, I was not aware of the fact that my wife, who was the principal witness against me,
could not be compelled to be a witness against me if she declined to testify. I was not aware
of, nor was I informed of the possible defense strategies such as to 'seeking a plea in abeyance'
or the different consequences of pleading to a domestic assault rather than to interruption
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of a communication device. I was not informed nor was I aware of the possible consequences
of my plea, such as its effect on my immigration status.
The Court did not verbally inform me of my Constitutional Rights. I was presented with a
partially completed Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel
a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto, marked Exhibit "B" and by reference
made a part hereof; although I signed the partially completed form, I had not completely
read nor understood all of the six-page form, and I did not fully understand the content of
said form.
I did not understand and I don't recall being informed of the elements of the crimes of which
1 was charged and further, the elements were not set forth in Exhibit "B".
That on or prior to June 18, 2002,1 contacted Attorney Paul Kawai regarding my conviction
and its possible consequences, particularly on my immigration status. Attorney Kawai
informed me that he was not sure, but it may affect my immigration status. I retained
Attorney Paul Kawai on or about June 18, 2002, to advise and represent me and to move to
withdraw my conviction. Attorney Paul Kawai failed to make a written Motion to Withdraw
the Guilty Plea within the required thirty-day period.
That the offense of which I was convicted is a deportable offense under the Immigration and
Nationality Act [8 U.S.C. 1227], see Exhibit "C" attached hereto and by reference made a
part hereof. I am a resident alien and if I had been advised that my conviction would be a
deportable offense, 1 would not have entered a plea of guilty.
DATED this 19th day of August, 2003.

RAJI BARBIR, Re#>ondcnt

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 19th day

030H\Affidavit.wpd

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to:
Justin Johanson
Orem City Prosecutor
56 North State Street
Orem,UT 84057
DATED this 19th day of August, 2003. _

O30l4\Affidam.wpd

3

/ '

Exhibit "B"

IN THIS

luUKTll
UTAII

JUDICIALplSTRICTCOURT
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATEIVUENT OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

CITY OF OREM

Plaintiff,

Case No,

vs.

iu^J^di,
Defendant.
^ Uercby ^cksvo^kdgp and certify that I U a ^ teev\
advised of and that I understand tlie following facts and rights:

I, fsl\\ (?*^>>

Notification of Charge
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes
Degree

Crime & Statutory
Provision
A.

Jf^^Uih

A

A / v ^ o / r ^ 1/\L>UIXCL

B.

D.

_

1

Punishment
Min/Max aiid/or
Minimum Mandatory

T have received a copy of flic (Amended) Information against inc. I have read it, or
had it read to mc, and I understand the nature and the elements of crimefs) to which T njn
pleading guilty (or no contest).
The elements of the crime(s) to wliich I am pleadmg guilty (or no contest) are:

I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting'that I committed the crimes
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court lo accept my guilty
(or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty
(or no contest):

Waiver of Constitutional Rights
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the 'following rights:.
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand
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that I might later, if die judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the
appointed lawyer's service to me.
1 (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel
I have clone so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons:

If I have waived my right to counsel, I ceitify that I have read this statement and that
I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I ampleading guilty
(or no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the
consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s).
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is
.
My attorney and I liave fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of
my guilty (or no contest) plea(s).
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest).
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have
a jury trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against
me and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the
opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me.
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call
witnesses ifI chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and
testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the
State would pay those costs.
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to
have a jury trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know Uiat if I
chose not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself.
I also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my
refusal to testify against me.

Presumption of innocence and biirden of proof. I know that if I do not plead
guilty (or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the
charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges againsFme,Ineed only plead "not guilty,"
and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving
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each clement of the chargc(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If (he trial is before a jury, the
verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I giye up the presumption of
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above.
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for/me. I understand that I am giving up
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest).
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all
the statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penally, I will be subjecting myself to serving
a mandator/ penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or
both.
I know Uiat in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be
imposed. I also know Uiat I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of
a plea agreement.
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms* I know that if there is more than one crime
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run
at the same time (concurrently). I know tliat I may be charged an additional fine for each
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing
on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no
contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be
inappropriate.
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Plea bargain. My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are) fis/nronoOllir ir^rnli 4lr.ijiJca
barpnin bolwmi myself anil |||o installing attorney. All the promises, duties', and
pio visions of tlie plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those
explained below:

Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of tlie charges
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or tlie prosecutnig attorney are not
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they
believe tlie judge may do are not binding on the judge.
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness
I am entering Uiis plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises
except tliose contained in this statement have been made to me.
I have read tliis statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to
change or delete any tiling contained hi this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes
because all of tlie statements are correct
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
I am
years of age. I have attended school through the
grade. I can read
and understand the English language. IfI do not understand English, an interpreter has been
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any dings, medication, or intoxicants
which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under
tlie influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants wliich impair my judgment.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing
or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.

5

I understand (lint ifl want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must
file n written motion to withdraw my plea(s) within 30 days after Tliavehccitsciifo.iin-d
ami final judgment has been entei ed. 1 will only be allowed to withdraw my plea i f l
show good cause. I will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after 30 days for any
reason.
Dated this 22*

day of

, ICtQ.

\MCAK\

Certificate of Defense Attorney
I eertify that I am the attorney for
, the defendant
above, and tliat I know he/she has read the statement or tliat I have read it to him/her; I have
discussed it with him/her and believe tliat he/she fully understands Hie meaning of its
contents and is mentally and physically competent To the best ofmy knowledge and belief,
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of Uie crime(s) and the factual synopsis of
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly staled; and these, along with the other
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoiug affidavit, arc
accurate and true.

tfct^AH £
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
Bar No. 1*%3
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Order

Based on thefeelsset forth hi the foregoing Statement and the certification of (lie
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely,
knowingly, and voluntarily made.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered.
Dated this "Z7^- day of

J:

Exhibit "C"

IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT

§ 237(a)(3)(C)li)

[8 U.S.C. § 1227]
>(W)m Crimes o[ Domesticviojcupc,. stalking, or violation of protection, order,..crimes
Againsttfiij&cnand.—
•tdi ppnicstip^okn
—Any alien who at any time after
ennV-iicdifivic'ted
violence, a crime of stalking, or a crime of
child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment is deportable. For purposes of this
clause, the term "crime of domestic violence" means any enme of violence (as defined in section 16 of title 18, United States Code) against a person committed by a
current or former spouse of the person, by an individual with whom the person
shares a child in common, by an individual who is cohabiting with or has cohabited
with (lie person as a spouse, by an individual similarly situated to a spouse of the
person under the domestic or family violence laws of the jurisdiction where the offense occurs, or by any other individual against a person who is protected from that
individual's acts under the domestic or family violence laws of the United States or
any State, Indian tribal government, or unit oflocal government.
$!J Violators of protection orders.—Any alien who at any time after entry ts
enjoined under a protection order issued by a court and whom the court determines
has engaged in conduct that violates the portion of a protection order that involves
protection against credible tlucats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury
to the person or persons for whom the protection order was issued is deportable. For
purposes of this clause, the tenn "protection order" means any injunction issued lor
the purpose of preventing violent or threatening acts of domestic violence, including
temporary or final orders issued by civil or criminal courts (oilier dian support or
child custody orders or provisions) whether obtained by filing an independent action or as a pendente lite order in another proceeding.
(^Failure to register and falsification of documents.—
($#) Change of address.—An ^^y/h^Ji^J^i^dJp^omgfy
with the, pro visions of
section 265. is deportable, .unless the. alien csUbhshes,to-trie, satisfaction of the Attorney
General tliat such failure was reasonably.excusabJe..'priwas not willful.
(B) Failure to register or falsification of documents.—Any alien who at any time has
been convicted—
%\) under section 266(c) of this Act or under section 36(c) of the Alien Registration
Act, 1940,
$}) of a violation of, or an attempt or a conspiracy to violate, any provision of the
Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 6i 1 et scq.), or
(ifr) of a violation of or an attempt or a conspiracy to violate, section 15^6 of title
18, United Stater, Code (relating tofraudand misuse of visas, permits, and other em
try documents), is deportable.
id) Document fraud.—m
(i) It) general- An alien who is the subject of a final orderforviolation of section
274C is deportable.

,,J

Added by §3*0 of IIRAIRA, effective for "convictions, or violitions of court orders, occumng fftisr tlit date c! enactment ot"

[URAUIA]/"'
:

*Amende<!by 5345(b) of! iRAIRA, effective en the date of enactment dfllRAJRA.

[March 2002]
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Addendum 5

Justin Johanson (#8989)
CITY OF OREM
56 North State Street
Orem,Utah 84057
Telephone: 801-229-7097
Fax: 801-860-2024
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, OREM DEPARTMENT

CITY OF OREM,
AMENDED MOTION AND
MEMORANDUM IN OBJECTION
TO DEFENDANTS PETITION
FOR RELIEF UNDER THE
POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT

Plaintiff,
v.
RAJIBARBIR,

Case'No.-fl2i2=088t-

Defendant.

The Honorable John C. Backlund

COMES NOW the City of Orem ("the City") and provides its Amended Motion and
Memorandum in in opposition to the defendant's petition for relief under the post-conviction
remedies act. The City hereby incorporates and includes all facts, legal points of authorities,
arguments, and conclusions of law included in the City's original motion and memorandum in
objection to the defendant's petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act.
ISSUE 1
Should the Court summarily dismiss the defendant's petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65(C)?
As a preliminary matter, the defendant has filed a Petition for Post-Conviction relief pursuant
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to Utah Code Ann. §78-35a-102(2002). The Utah Code Ann. §78-35a-102(2002), establishes "a
substantive legal remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal
offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies, including direct appeal.... Utah Code Ann.
§78-35a-102(2002). The statute provides, unless precluded by §78-35a-106 or §78-35a-107, that

"person who has been convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an
action in the district court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate
or modify the conviction or sentence upon grounds that (a) the conviction was
obtained or sentence was imposed in violation of the United States Constitution or
Utah Constitution; (b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that is violation
of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which the
petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected; (c) the sentence was imposed
in an unlawful manner, or probation was revoked in an unlawful manner; (d) the
petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel violation of the United States
Constitution or Utah Constitution; or (e) newly discovered material evidence exists
that requires the court to vacate the conviction or sentences..." Utah Code Ann. §7835a-104(2002).
The Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65(C) governs the proceedings in all petitions for postconviction relief filed under Utah Code Ami. §78-35a-101 et seq (2002). In essence the petitioners
shall set for all the claims in relation to the legality of the conviction or sentence, See Utah R. Civ.
P. 65(C)(c), and if available to the petitioner, attach to the petition: affidavits, copies or records and
other evidence in support of the allegations; a copy of relevant orders and memoranda of the court
See Utah R. Civ. P. 65(C)(d). Furthermore, the petitioner shall not set forth arguments or citations
or discuss authorities in the petition, but must do so in a separate memorandum, two copies which
shall be filed with the petition. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65(C)(e). The assigned judge shall review the
petition, and, if it is apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated in a prior proceeding,
or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue a an order
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dismissing the claim, stating the claim has been adjudicated or the claim is frivolous on its face. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 65(C)(c)
Based upon these statutes the City respectfully request this court to first, forthwith dismiss
the defendant's petition for post-conviction relief for failure to comply with Rule 65(C) and the
claim being "frivolous on its face" pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 65(C)(g)(l), and to
summarily dismiss the the Petition on the basis the defendant has failed to show to this court that
the defendant's prior three attorney's conduct and performance justify ineffective assistance of
counsel.
I. "Frivolous as a Matter of law"
In order to file a proper petition for post-conviction remedies, the defendant is required to
file pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 65(C), which lists the procedural provisions. Pursuant
to the plain language of rule 65(C)(g), when a court receives a petition for post conviction relief it
must first evaluate the petition to determine whether any claim has been previously adjudicated or
whether the petition "appears frivolous on its face." State v. Moench, 2002 UT App 333 P6, 57
P.3d 1116. If the facts alleged in the petition "appears frivolous as a matter of law, or if the claims
have no arguable basis in fact, then the court shall dismiss the petition as frivolous on its face. Id
at P6. A petition is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations contained in the
pleadings and attachments, it appears that: (A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as
a matter of law; (B) the claims have no arguable basis in fact; or (C) the petition challenges the
sentence only and the sentence has expired prior to the filing of the petition. See Utah R. Civ. P.
65(C)(g)(2).
Furthermore, the basis of the defendant's motion is for ineffective assistance of counsel. To
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prevail in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must meet a two-part test. First,
the defendant must show "that counsel's performance was deficient." State v. Gardner. 844 P.2d
293,297 (Utah 1992). In doing so, the defendant must "identify the acts or omissions which, under
the circumstances, show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness." Id at 297. In addition, the defendant must show prejudice. Id at 297. That is, the
petitioner, must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id at 297.
In arguing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant has the burden of meeting
both parts of the tests and must affirmatively prove prejudice. Id at 298. In so doing, the proof of
ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality.
State v. Coonce, 2001 UT App 355 PI8, 36 P.3d 533(emphasis added).
First, the petitioner claims in his amended petition that the Petitioner had not had a
reasonable time to confer with counsel and that he had been incarcerated and counsel had been
appointed just prior to the Court proceeding. See First Amended Petition at \2. The defendant fails
to include any facts in his affidavit that he met with the Public Defender, for it is a common practice
that prior to the court hearing a matter with incarcerated defendants the public defender will meet
and speak with each incarcerated defendant. He also fails to include any details as to what they
discussed in this meeting so as to justify ineffective assistance. The defendant only claims that he
did not have reasonable time to confer with counsel. Moreover, the defendant fails to cite to any
legal precedent indicating how such conduct fall below the standard set forth in State v. Gardner,
844 P.2d 293,297 (Utah 1992)(the defendant must "identify the acts or omissions which, under the
circumstances, show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
4

and that counsel's performance was deficient. In addition, the defendant must show prejudice.)
Furthermore, the defendant fails to include an affidavit by the public defender regarding
meeting with the defendant and what they talked about regarding his current situation. At the
previous court hearing regarding the petition for post-conviction relief the defendant and his
attorney spoke with Mr. Lish. Clearly there would have been time and access to arrange for and
have the public defender sign an affidavit and submit the affidavit to the court for review. Failing
to do so violates the plain language of Rule 65C(d).
Second, the defendant claims that did not have knowledge of the nature of the court
proceedings or the elements of the crime of which he was charged. See First Amended Petition at
T[3. This is not true because the defendant was given a copy of the information and the court read
to him the charges against him and nature and penalties of each crime. The fact that he did not have
knowledge of the nature of the court or proceedings is irrelevant and not a basis to have a plea
withdrawn.
Third, the defendant claims that he was not aware of possible defenses to the crimes for
which he was charged and that his wife could not be compelled to testify against him. See First
Amended Petition at ^3. Also, he claims that he was not aware of possible defense strategies such
as a plea in abeyance or different consequences between domestic violence-assault and domestic
violence-interruption with a communication device. See First Amended Petition at ^[3.
In this case, Mr. Lish met with the defendant and after discussing the case with the
defendant, asked the prosecutor if he would be willing to make an offer. The City stated that if the
defendant plead guilty to the class B misdemeanor Domestic Violence-Assault, punishable with a
fine not to exceed $1,000 and a jail sentence not to exceed 6 months, the City would then dismiss
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the second class B misdemeanor Domestic Violence-Interruption with a communication device.
First, accepting and advising a defendant to plead guilty to a reduce charge, and thereby
avoiding a harsher sentence, is a strategic decision that does not constitute a basis for a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Unites States v. Eisen, 974 F.2d 246, 265 (2nd Cir. 1992).
Strategic decisions by trial counsel do not amount to ineffective assistance. Mitchell v. Scully. 746
F.2d 951, 954-55 (2d Cir.

1984)(failing to inform defendant of an available defense is not

ineffective assistance where there was "exceedingly little likelihood" that the defense would succeed
and greater likelihood that it would expose defendant to greater punishment than pleading guilty.)
Again, the defendant fails to include an affidavit by the public defender regarding meeting
with the defendant and what they talked about regarding his current situation. The defendant has
failed to show that an actual "defense" to his crimes exists and that the defense would likely succeed.
Rather, he merely states that possible strategies were not discussed, such as a plea-in-abeyance. The
defendant request that this Court presuppose, absent an affidavit by Mr. Lish, that such a topic
should have been discussed and actually would have been obtained by the City. The defendant fails
to state that the prosecution never offered a plea-in-abeyance at the time of his arraignment, but
rather, the City required the defendant to plead to the Domestic Violence-Assault. The defendant
request the court presuppose that had the defendant and Mr. Lish actually discussed the meaning
and consequence of a plea-in-abeyance such discussion would have actually resulted in actually
obtaining such a plea bargain and would have been approved by the Court. Such broad stroked
allegations and conclusions are insufficient for Post-Conviction relief. Austin v. Delaware, 2002
Del. Sup. Lexis 535. (Austin claimed the that counsel did not review any of the relevant and
applicable principles of law and that defense counsel failed to investigate the state's case.)
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Moreover, the point as to possible defense strategies, such as a plea-in-abeyance is moot with
regards to Mr. Lish because the prosecution never offered the defendant that plea bargain.
Furthermore, the defendant has claimed that there are differences between domestic violenceassault and domestic violence-interruption of a communication devices. However, the defendant has
failed to show to the court what exactly are the alleged actual differences between the crimes. The
defendant includes no statutory, case law, or explanation as to how these crimes differ, if any.
Again, the defendant request this court to draw conclusion and results without showing how such
differences of the crimes are ineffective assistance and how they would prejudice the defendant.
Such arguments fail to meet the burden as required by Rule 65C for a showing of ineffective
assistance of counsel which requires that the defendant identify the acts or omissions which, under
the circumstances, show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, that counsel's performance was deficient, and the defendant was prejudice. State
v. Gardner. 844 P.2d 293, 297 (Utah 1992).
Fourth, the defendant claims that he "was not informed or aware of possible consequences
of his plea, such as to his immigration status." See First Amended Petition at f 3. The defendant cites
to and argues the applicability of State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT App 203, 73 P.3d 967.
In Roias-Martinez, the defendant was charged with one count of sexual battery, a class A
misdemeanor. Prior to pleading guilty, the defendant's attorney advised the defendant, a Mexican
citizen, on the issue of deportation. Specifically, the defendant's attorney advised him that he
"might or might not" be deported. The defendant then plead guilty and affirmatively responded that
he understood his rights at the plea hearing. Later, the defendant sought to timely withdraw his
guilty plea on the basis that his defense counsel affirmatively misrepresented the deportation
7

consequences of the defendant's guilty plea.. The trial court denied his motion. The defendant then
appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals.
The Utah Court of Appeals recognized that deportation is a "collateral consequence" of a
conviction. State v. Roias-Martinez. 2003 UT App 203,73 P.3d 967; State v. McFadden. 884 P.2d
1303, 1303 (Utah App. 1994)(holding that possible deportation consequences, which in Utah are
collateral consequences, do not affect the voluntariness of the plea, hence, the trial court need not
instruct a defendant as to such deportation consequences prior to accepting the guilty plea.). The
Rojas-Martinez Court point out that based on McFadden an attorneys failure to inform a client of
the deportation consequences of a guilty plea, without more, does not fall below an objective
standard of reasonableness. State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT App 203 f7,73 P.3d 967. However,
a commonly recognized exception to this rule exist when an attorney affirmatively misrepresents
deportation consequences to his or her client. Id at f 8. The Court of Appeals stated that because the
1996 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act eliminated all discretion as to deportation
of non-citizens convicted of aggravated felonies,(sexual battery is a crime that is considered as an
aggravated felony under the 8 U.S.C.A. §1101 (a)(43)(2002)), the defendant's guilty plea means
virtually automatic, unavoidable deportation. Id at ^[9.
The Court of Appeals held that since the defendant's attorney did admit to advising his client
that he "might or might not" be deported he affirmatively misrepresented to his client deportation
consequences. Id at ^[10.
However, in this case Roias-Martinez does not even apply. In the defendant's own affidavit
he states that "I was not informed nor was I aware of the possible consequences of my plea, such as
its effect on my immigration status." See Affidavit of Raji Barbir %L\ First Amended Petition for
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Post-Conviction Relief at ^3. Such statements in the Mr. Barbir's affidavit and Petition confirms
that his defense attorney, Randy Lish, did not advise, inform, or make aware of any possible
immigration consequences, such as deportation. Failure to advise, inform, or make aware of any
collateral consequence, such as possible deportation consequences, is clearly not ineffective
assistance of counsel. State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT App 203 f7, 73 P.3d 967(an attorneys
failure to inform a client of the deportation consequences of a guilty plea, without more, does not
fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.) Therefore, again, the petitioner has failed to
reach his burden of proof for showing ineffective assistance of counsel.
Finally, the petitioner was given a copy of a statements of rights advising him of the
constitutional rights he would be waiving. This was in addition to the oral recitation given by Judge
Backlund to all persons present at the beginning of the morning calender. The petitioner reviewed
the document and knowingly and voluntarily signed the statement, (see attached copy of Statement
of Rights).

The public defender signed the document, and the court inquired if he read and

understood the rights he was waiving. The petitioner acknowledged to the court he understood the
consequence of his actions and received a factual basis from the City to support the guilty verdict.
The defendant claims that the form was "partially completed." Yet, he fails to indicate what
portion of the form was not filled out and how that relates to ineffective assistance of counsel. He
has failed to cite to any legal points or authorities indicating to the court that such a form would then
be ineffective assistance prejudicing the defendant.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, in addition to the already submitted Motion and Memorandum, which the city
incorporates into this Motion and Memorandum and in reviewing the entire petition on a whole, the
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petitioner has made "over-broad and generalized accusations, which are wholly conclusary, which
do not support entitlement of relief' under the post-conviction remedies act. Austin v. Delaware,
2002 Del. Super. LEXIS 535: See Younger v. State. 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). His claims
are void of substance and merit as to all claims listed in his petition. Therefore the City request the
petitioners claims be summarily dismissed pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 65(C)(g)(l) and (2) on the
basis that the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law and the claims have
no arguable basis in fact.
The City therefore respectfully requests that Petitioners claim for Post-Conviction Relief be
summarily dismissed.
Dated this ]L

day of i J f e f l ^ / g Y ^ , 2003.

JustiaJohanson
OySpi City Pr^eptitor
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Addendum 6

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, OREM DEPARTMENT

CITY OF OREM,
Plaintiff
v.

RAJI BARBIR,

FINDINGS AND ORDER
ON OBJECTION TO MOTION
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR PETITION FOR RELIEF
UNDER THE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES
Case No. 0212-0881
JUDGE JOHN C BACKLUND

Defendant.

THE COURT , having reviewed defendant's petition for relief under the post-conviction
remedies act and the City's objection .thereto, hereby DENIES the Defendant's petition for relief
under the post-conviction remedies act on the basis that it is apparent to the Court that the
petitioner's claims appear frivolous on its face, the facts alleged in the petition do not support a
claim for relief as a matter of law, and/or have no arguable basis in fact. The Court hereby
summarily dismisses the Petition Pursuant to the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65(C)(g)(l). The
Court makes the following findings:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On May 22, 2003, the defendant was in custody and met with the Public Defender,
Randy Lish. an attorney with over 20 years legal experience, for the charges of
Domestic Violence- Assault, a class B misdemeanor, and Domestic ViolenceInterruption with a communication device, a class B misdemeanor.

2.

Pursuant to the Orem City Attorney's office policy, the City offered Mr. Barbir a

plea bargain, rather than plead not guilty and set the matter for trial. The plea
agreement required Mr. Barbir to plea to the Domestic Violence-Assault and in
exchange for the agreement, the City would dismiss the second count of Domestic
Violence-Interruption with a communication device, a class B misdemeanor.
c.

Before the court accepted the plea, the Defendant was given a statement of rights (a
written form indicating all of the defendant's Rule 11 constitutional rights listing all
the rights he would be knowingly and voluntarily be waiving) for the defendant and
the public defender to review. The defendant sat at counsel's table and filled out a
statement of rights. This document was in addition to the Oral Statement of rights
read by the court at the beginning of the arraignment calendar.

d.

The defendant read over the document and signed the statement of rights indicating
he knowingly and voluntarily waive all rights contained in the document.

e.

The public defender, appearing with the defendant, since he was in custody, reviewed
the document and signed it himself.

f.

The Court asked the defendant for his plea, Risked t
/ understood the Statement of rightslrrsupport of his
knowingly and voluntarily was waiving those rights.

g.

The defendant acknowledged he was voluntarily waiving his rights and the court then
accepted his guilty plea.

h.

The defendant was ordered to pay a nominal fine of $400 (a $600 suspension off of
the maximum fine of $1,000) and to serve 10 days in jail. Also, the defendant was
ordered to receive a domestic violence evaluation and placed on 1 year probation.
Furthermore, a no contact order was issued against the defendant.
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On May 30,2002, eight days later, the victim appeared and requested the no contact
order listed. The defendant did not appear at this hearing, thus the court indicated
it would send notice of the dismissal of the no contact order and scheduled a review
hearing for June 25, 2002.
On June 21, 2002, exactly 30 days after the date of sentencing, the defendant
apparently retained a private attorney, Paul Kawai, to represent him for the June 25,
2002 review hearing. Mr. Kawai sent notice of appearance as counsel. The City of
Orem received the notice on June 24, 2002, exactly 33 days after sentencing.
On June 25,2002, prior to the defendant's case being heard by the court, Mr. Kawai
requested that his client be offered a plea in abeyance. The city responded that it
would not object to this, but would have to comply with the original terms of
sentencing.
The court reviewed the defendant's case and why the defendant had not called the
jail by 5:00 p.m. on May 22,2002 to arrange work release. (The record indicates the
Utah County Jail sent notice to the Court on May 31, 2002, that the defendant was
no longer eligible for work release due to his delay in contacting the jail).
Mr. Kawai presented to the court that arrangements were made to resolve the jail
issue and the defendant was going to call on June 25, 2002.
Mr. Kawai then requested the court hold the original guilty plea in abeyance. His
reasons were (1) the defendant is from a foreign country and faced possible
deportation charges, and (2) his wife is seven months pregnant and would face
extreme hardship with the deportation of her husband.
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The Court asked the City if the City had knowledge of the fact the victim was
pregnant. The City responded it did not have knowledge of her pregnancy, given the
fact that in the police report no indications of the victim being present were
mentioned. (The defendant could have been charged with a class A misdemeanor,
domestic violence-assault).
The Court stated since the victim was pregnant and he assaulted her, his chances for
having his plea withdrawn were not very high.
Mr. Kawai clarified to the court that the defendant was not seeking to withdraw the
guilty plea, only that it be held in abeyance on the basis previously stated.
Mr. Kawai, further indicated to the court that his client was the person who called
the police, was very cooperative, and assisted in the investigation.
The Court recognized the defendant's cooperation and assistance, but felt that it
would be unfair and unjust for non-U.S. citizen to be given a plea in abeyance when
he or she is facing possible deportation consequence when the court would not give
a plea in abeyance to a U.S. citizen who faces no possible deportation consequence.
The Court denied the request and left the original sentence in place.
On February 20,2003, almost 9 months later, the defendant retained another private
attorney, German Flores.
On March 20,2003, Mr. Flores filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea, requesting
to extend 30 day time limit to withdraw the plea claiming the court violated the
defendants rule 11 constitutional rights.
The City objected to this motion and the court scheduled oral arguments on the
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motion for April 30, 2003.
x.

German Flores, presented to the court the same factual basis the petition now claims
in his post-conviction relief that "within the 30 days the petitioner appeared with
counsel requesting the plea-in-abeyance, to which the City objected as to the factual
presentation and correctly pointed out that the defendant appeared 34 days later and
only requested a plea-in-abeyance to avoid deportation.

y.

The Court denied the motion on the basis that all Rule 11 rights were given to the
defendant.

z.

On August 1, 2003, the Court scheduled this case on a law and motion calendar
pursuant to Rule 65(C)(j).

aa.

The City objected at the hearing stating that Rule 65(C)(j) was only to be scheduled
after all of the pleadings are closed and the Court has made an initial ruling on the
pleadings.

bb.

The City reaffirmed their argument as contained in their original brief and the
defendant has failed to meet the plain language of the statute as required in Rule
65(C)(c)-(e).

cc.

The defendant argued that he should be allowed a 20 day period to cure and amend
the defects of his petition and be permitted to submit a memorandum, affidavits,
copies of records, citations, copies of the pleadings, and all relevant court orders and
other pleadings involved in this case.

dd.

The City objected stating that the defendant failed to comply with the plain language
of Rule 65(d) and (e), thus should be permitted to cure and amend their petition, but
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any portions of Rule 65(d) and (e)(such as memorandums, affidavits, copies of
records, citations, previous orders, pleadings, and petitions) that "were available" to
the defendant through reasonable efforts should be denied and not be allowed to be
submitted with the amended petition prior to the Court issuing a ruling,
ee.

The Court denied the City's request and later received amended motions and
memorandum from both the City and the Defendant.

CONCLUSION OF LAW
1.

This Court finds that Utah Code Ann. §78-35a-102(2002), establishes "a substantive
legal remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal
offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies, including direct appeal....
Utah Code Ann. §78-35a-l02(2002)..

2.

The statute provides, unless precluded by §78-35a-106 or §78-35a-107, that a:
"person who has been convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an
action in the district court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate
or modify the conviction or sentence upon grounds that (a) the conviction was
obtained or sentence was imposed in violation of the United States Constitution or
Utah Constitution; (b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that is violation
of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which the
petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected; (c) the sentence was imposed
in an unlawful manner, or probation was revoked in an unlawful manner; (d) the
petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel violation of the United States
Constitution or Utah Constitution; or (e) newly discovered material evidence exists
that requires the court to vacate the conviction or sentences..." Utah Code Ann. §7835a-104(2002)..

3.

The Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65(C) governs the proceedings in all petitions for
post-conviction relief filed under Utah Code Ann. §78-35a-101 et seq (2002). In
essence the petitioners shall set for all the claims in relation to the legality of the
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conviction or sentence, See Utah R. Civ. P. 65(C)(c), and if available to the
petitioner, attach to the petition: affidavits, copies or records and other evidence in
support of the allegations; a copy of relevant orders and memoranda of the court See
Utah R. Civ. P. 65(C)(d)..
4.

Furthermore, the petitioner shall not set forth arguments or citations or discuss
authorities in the petition, but must do so in a separate memorandum, two copies
which shall be filed with the petition. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65(C)(e).

5.

The Court finds that the defendant did fail to initially provide the court with
affidavits, memorandums, copies of pleadings, rulings, previously filed motions, ect,
but later allowed defendant 20 days to cure and amend the claims.

6.

The Court having reviewed the petition, and, determines that it is apparent to the
court the claims in the petition appears frivolous on its face, this court is issuing a
an order dismissing the claim as frivolous on its face. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65(C)(c).

7.

Pursuant to the plain language of rule 65(C)(g), having received a petition for post
conviction relief this Court has evaluated the petition to determine whether any
claim has been previously adjudicated or whether the petition "appears frivolous on
its face." State v. Moenchu 2002 UT App 333 P6, 57 P.3d 1116.

8.

A petition is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations contained in
the pleadings and attachments, it appears that: (A) the facts alleged do not support
a claim for relief as a matter of law; (B) the claims have no arguable basis in fact; or
(C) the petition challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired prior to the
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filing of the petition. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65(C)(g)(2).
9.

In this case the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law and
have no arguable basis in fact.

10.

The petitioner claims both defense attorney's actions at the time the defendant first
appeared with the public defender, Randy Lish, and the second time (34 days after
his sentence) with Mr. Kawai, his own private counsel, were ineffective assistance
of counsel.

11.

In the petitioners claim, he fails to correctly identify the underlying facts of the case.

12.

The petitioner sets forth as his factual basis a claim that the petitioner " appeared,
within the thirty (30) days of the conviction, with counsel and discussed withdrawal
of his plea with the court and a possible agreement with the prosecuting attorney for
a plea-in-abeyance, but that counsel failed to make a written request or appeal any
decisions of the Court." See Petition at ^f5.

13.

It is worthy to note that when the Petitioner appeared with his third lawyer, German
Flores, and Mr. Flores presented this same argument to the court that "within the 30
days the petitioner appeared with counsel requesting the plea-in-abeyance, to which
the City objected as to the factual presentation and correctly pointed out that the
defendant appeared 33 days later and only requested a plea-in-abeyance to avoid
deportation.

14.

The Court denied the motion on the basis that all Rule 11 rights were given to the
defendant."). (See Record on April 30, 2003).

15.

A review of the Courts written record clearly indicates the defendant plead guilty on
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May 22, 2002.
16.

The court then terminated the protective order on May 30,2002 at the request of the
victim; the defendant did not appear on this date.

17.

The only time the defendant appeared with counsel, after the sentencing date, was on
June 25, 2002.

18.

This was 34 days after the defendant was sentenced.

19.

A review of the recorded tape on June 25, 2002 indicates the defendant's second
attorney, Paul Kawai, never requested the defendant's plea to be withdrawn.

20.

Mr. Kawai only requested the plea be held in abeyance.

21.

Mr. Kawai presented to the court that his client was facing possible deportation
charges and did not want to be separated from his pregnant wife.

22.

The Court denied the request based on the victim being pregnant and no non-U.S.
citizen will be treated better, i.e., be given a plea-in-abeyance because of possible
deportation charges, than a U.S. citizen who is not facing deportation charges.

23.

Mr. Kawai also indicated the defendant is still willing to complete the jail time and
is reporting to the jail for work release arrangements.

24.

The petitioner claims that Mr. Kawai's failure to file a written motion to withdraw
the guilty plea is ineffective assistance of counsel.

25.

What the petitioner fails to mention is that Mr. Kawai was retained and sent to the
Court and the City notice of appearance on June 21, 2002, exactly 30 days after the
date of sentence.

26.

The City received his notice of appearance on June 24, 2002, 33 days later.
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27.

As of June 21, 2002, the City had not even sent Mr. Kawai discovery.

28.

The petitioner indirectly claims that Mr. Kawai should have blindly sent the motion
to withdraw the petitioners guilty plea" without the opportunity to review the file and
to properly determine if he legally and justifiably had "time" to file the motion.

29.

The petition presupposes that the petitioner actually wanted the plea withdrawn.

30.

The petitioner fails to include any affidavit discussing his arrangement with Mr.
Kawai and that he in fact wanted his guilty plea to be withdrawn.

31.

However, the petitioner did allege in his amended petition and affidavit he sought to
have his plea withdraw, but fails to include an affidavit by Mr. Kawai or given a
reason why his affidavit is not included in the petition.

32.

This would essentially require the attorney-client privilege to be waived and the
defendant has failed to indicate to the court whether he intended to do so in the
petition.

33.

Thus, the petitioner is essentially requesting the court to "second-guess" the
conversation, discussion, and tactical strategies reviewed between Mr. Kawai and
the petitioner.

34.

The Court refuse to "second-guess" such discussion, absent a signed waiver of
attorney-client privilege and affidavit included by Mr. Kawai.

35.

Moreover, the petitioner fails to recognize that Mr. Kawai did not have any legal
basis on June 25, 2002 to even ask or request, either verbally or in writing, to have
the plea withdrawn.

36.

The Petitioner alleges several claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, both in
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the original petition and his amended petition, which is supported by a memorandum.
This Court finds that in order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
the petitioner must meet a two-part test.
First, the defendant must show "that counsel's performance was deficient." State v.
Gardner, 844 P.2d 293, 297 (Utah 1992). In doing so, the defendant must "identify
the acts or omissions which, under the circumstances, show that counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id at 297.
Second, the defendant must show prejudice. Id at 297.
In showing prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. Id at 297.
The defendant has the burden of meeting both parts of the tests and must
affirmatively prove prejudice. Id at 298.

In so doing, the proof of ineffective

assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable
reality. State v. Coonce, 2001 UT App 355 PI8, 36 P.3d 533.
The petitioner alleges several claims for ineffective assistance of counsel, but the
petitioner fails to meet his burden on each of the claims listed below in no particular
order.

_

_

First, the defendant claims that his second attorney, Mr. Kawai failed to file a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
The Court finds that the petitioner cites no legal authority that failure to file a motion
to withdraw would be per se "ineffective assistance of counsel."
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45.

In considering the 2 prong test standard it is clear the petitioner could not make out
a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel as to failing to file a written motion to
withdraw the guilty plea because legally, the Court had no jurisdiction to consider the
motion on June 25, 2002 and the proposition that the defendant "should have filed
a motion to withdraw the guilty plea on June 21, 2002 (30 days after the sentence)"
only speculates, absent any direct proof from affidavits or the record, that the
petitioner wanted to withdraw the guilty plea, rather than seek a modification to the
sentence.

46.

The petitioner's amended complaint alleges he wanted his plea withdrawn, but
includes no waiver of counsel form nor includes an affidavit from Mr. Kawai or a
reason for not including such an affidavit.

47.

This court finds that on June 25,2002, the defendant appeared with his attorney and
requested a plea-in-abeyance and his attorney specifically stated he did not want to
withdraw his guilty plea. Juxtaposing the June 25,2003 argument and the petitioners
affidavit dated August 19,2003, absent an affidavit from Mr. Kawai the Court feels
the petitioner is requesting the Court to "second guess" the desires of the defendant,
regardless of the two seemingly incompatible positions taken by the petitioner.

48.

A review of the June 25, 2002 record even indicates that the court would have
declined any motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea given the victim was a female
and pregnant.

49.

Thus, the Courts position to deny any withdraw of a guilty plea or plea-in-abeyance,
based upon the status of the victim, greatly undermines the petitioner's burden to
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show counsel's unprofessional error of failing to seek a withdraw the guilty plea
based on possible deportation charge, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.
50.

Utah Case law is clear on the timeliness and jurisdiction of seeking to withdraw the
guilty plea.

51.

A withdrawal of a plea of guilty is a privilege, not a right, and is within the sound
discretion of the trial court. State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah 1987).

52.

In Utah a plea of guilty may be withdrawn only upon a showing of good cause and
leave of the trial court. Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6(2)(a) (2001), see also, State v.
Gamblin, 2000 UT 44,1(8, 1 P.3d 1103.

53.

Section §77-13-6(2)(b) provides: "A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no
contest is made by motion and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the
plea.

54.

Once a guilty plea has been entered, a defendant has thirty days from the entry of
final judgment of conviction at the district court to file a motion to withdraw his plea.
State v. Dean, 2002 UT App 323 P6, 457 Utah Adv. Rep. 11.

55.

The thirty-day limitation on the filing of a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no
contest begins to run at the time the trial court enters a final judgment of conviction
based on the plea and in the context of criminal cases, the sentence is the final
judgement. State v. McGee. 2001 UT 69, P8, 31 P.3d 531.

56.

This Court finds that May 22, 2002 would have been the starting date for the 30 day
time period to run.
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57.

June 21, 2002 would have been the thirtieth day to withdraw the plea or appeal the
sentence.

58.

June 21, 2002 is the date Mr. Kawai sent notice of appearance of counsel.

59.

Additionally, the Court of Appeals has previously held that the time limit on
withdrawing a guilty plea is jurisdictional. Id at P6; See State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578,
582-84 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

60.

Accordingly, if a defendant is advised of the deadline when the plea is entered, the
trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider a motion to withdraw filed after the thirty-day
period. Id at P6; State v. Canfield, 917 P.2d 561 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).

61.

In State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 28. 996 P.2d 1065 (Ostler I), the Utah Court of
Appeals recognized a narrow exception to the jurisdictional rule in price by
considering the merits of untimely motions for withdrawal of guilty pleas if there is
plain error. Id at P6.

62.

However, this narrow exception to the jurisdictional rule was recently eliminated by
the Utah Supreme Court stating "because the appellant failed to file a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, the court lacked jurisdiction to address his challenge to the
plea, even for plain error. Id at P6; State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, PP3-4,40 P.3d 630
(emphasis added).

63.

The Supreme Court declined to hear Reyes's plain error argument and ruled "this
court may choose to review an issue not properly preserved for plain error. State v.
Reyes, 2002 UT 13, PP3-4.

64.

Thus this Court will not use plain error to reach an issue over which it has no
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jurisdiction. Id at PP3-4 (emphasis added).
65.

The Supreme Court went on to say Section 77-13-6 of the Utah Code requires a
defendant to file a motion to withdraw a guilty plea within thirty days after the entry
of the plea and that failure to do so extinguishes a defendant's right to challenge the
validity of the guilty plea on appeal. Id at P3.

66.

Thus, given such case law and interpretation, Mr. Kawai could not have legally filed
a written plea or even requested the withdraw on June 25, 2002 because the Court

\

had no jurisdiction and will not use plain error to reach the jurisdictional issue.

67.

Thus, had Mr. Kawai even indicated to the court he requested the withdraw of his
clients guilty plea, the court could not have entertained the motion.

68.

Moreover, the petitioner fails to include what the reasons for the withdraw of guilty
plea would have been premised upon; e.g., a rule 11 violation or a possible
deportation consequences, which in Utah is a collateral consequence and the
possibility of being deported does not affect the voluntariness of the plea, hence, the
trial court need not instruct a defendant as to such deportation consequences prior
to accepting the guilty plea. State v. McFadden, 884 P.2d 1303, 1303 (Utah App.
1994).

69.

Even so, had the petitioner even listed such theories there is no legal basis for the
petitioner to argue given the time limit of 30 day's expired, along with the
jurisdiction to withdraw the plea or appeal, even for plain error.

70.

Given the court did not have jurisdiction on June 25, 2002 to entertain any motion
to withdraw the plea,

the petitioner's defense counsel could not have been
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ineffective when the law would not even prohibit the motion to withdraw.
71.

Also, Mr. Kawai could not have reasonably filed an appeal to the Utah Court of
Appeals or motion to withdraw the guilty plea on the date of June 21, 2002 with any
good cause.

72.

Mr. Kawai did not have discovery and there is no indication the defendant retained
Mr. Kawai to appeal his case to the Utah Court of Appeals or even to withdraw the
guilty plea.

73.

A review of the record only indicates the petitioner's interest was to have his plea
held in abeyance for a time so as to avoid possible deportation charges.

74.

The petition fails to include any memorandum, citations, affidavits, or other
documents to support this theory for the appeal or the withdrawal of the guilty plea
on or before June 25, 2002.

75.

Therefore, the Court finds that based upon the inaccurate factual basis listed by the
petitioner and the lack of legal authority to support his position, the claim should
be forthwith dismissed for no legal basis pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
65(C).

76.

Also, this Court dismisses the petitioners claim that the Public Defender failed to
properly investigate the facts that would or could possibly convict the petitioner and
Orem City did not adequately fund the Public defender, because the petitioner has
failed to file any memorandum, citations, affidavits, or other documents in support.

77.

The petitioner reasserts this claims in his amended petition that the Petitioner had not
had a reasonable time to confer with counsel and that he had been incarcerated and

16

counsel had been appointed just prior to the Court proceeding. See First Amended
Petition at %L.
78.

The petitioner's claims are similar to Austin v. Delaware, where the petitioner
alleged the defense counsel failed to investigate the state's case. 2002 Del. Sup.
Lexis 535.

79.

Austin claimed the that counsel did not review any of the relevant and applicable
principles of law.

80.

In this case, the petitioner claims the defense counsel failed to advise the petitioner
of the consequences of his plea, possible defenses, and failed to take the time
necessary to ensure the prosecution could, and in fact would, convict the petitioner.

81.

Furthermore, the defendant claims the City of Orem failed to provide adequate legal
funding to the public defender.

82.

Similar to Austin, the petitioner's claim is rife with general allegations relating to
the impropriety and wrongdoing of defense counsel and the City, and asserts broad
stroked conclusions as to the effectiveness of his lawyers' performance or the City's
funding, while failing to point to specific, concrete allegations. Austin v. Delaware,
2002 Del. Sup. Lexis 535.

83.

Thus, absent concrete allegations of specific prejudice arising from particular
instances of the failure to provide possible defenses, investigation, and possible
consequences of guilty plea, the petitioners allegations are broad generalizations and
should be summarily dismissed pursuant to Utah Rule Civil Procedure 65(C). Austin
v. Delaware, 2002 Del. Sup. Lexis 535.
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84.

The Court finds the petitioner met with the public defender in closed chambers,
reviewed the case, facts, strengths and weakness, possible defenses, and discussed
and agreed to the proposed plea agreement offered by the City Attorney as indicated
in the log sheet in the Courts file.

85.

The defendant fails to include any facts in his affidavit that he met with the Public
Defender, for it is a common practice that prior to the court hearing a matter with
incarcerated defendants the public defender will meet and speak with each
incarcerated defendant.

86.

He also fails to include any details as to what they discussed in this meeting so as to
justify ineffective assistance.

87.

The defendant only claims that he did not have reasonable time to confer with
counsel.

88.

Moreover, the defendant fails to cite to any legal precedent indicating how such
conduct fall below the standard set forth in State v. Gardner, 844 P.2d 293, 297
(Utah 1992)(the defendant must "identify the acts or omissions which, under the
circumstances, show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness and that counsel's performance was deficient. In addition, the
defendant must show prejudice.)

89.

Furthermore, the defendant fails to include an affidavit by the public defender
regarding meeting with the defendant and what they talked about regarding his
current situation.

90.

At the previous court hearing held on August 1,2003, regarding the petition for post18

conviction relief, the defendant and his attorney spoke with Mr. Lish.
91.

Clearly there would have been time and access to arrange for and have the public
defender sign an affidavit and submit the affidavit to the court for review. Failing to
do so violates the plain language of Rule 65C(d).

92.

This Court finds the public defender made a special appearance with the petitioner
on May 22, 2002.

93.

Asa courtesy to all those persons in custody, the public defender will meet with each
person, review their case, analyze the strengths and weakness, discuss potential
consequences, and arrange for possible plea bargains with the City Attorney.

94.

Each defendant is free to accept the legal advise given and continue with the public
defender's legal representation or reject any advice and retain private counsel.

95.

The petitioner elected to proceed with Mr. Lish, who appeared with the defendant

96.

The defendant claims in his amended petition that he did not have knowledge of the
nature of the court proceedings or the elements of the crime of which he was charged.
See First Amended Petition at ^|3.

97.

This is not true because the defendant was given a copy of the information and the
court read to him the charges against him and nature and penalties of each crime.

98.

The fact that he did not have previous knowledge of the nature of the court or
proceedings is irrelevant and not a basis to have a plea withdrawn.

99.

The petitioner was given a copy of a statements of rights advising him of the
constitutional rights he would be waiving. (This was in addition to the oral recitation
given by the Court to all persons present at the beginning of the morning calender.)
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100.

The petitioner reviewed the document and knowingly and voluntarily signed the
statement, (see copy of Statement of Rights). (The elements of the crime were listed
on the information given to the defendant.)

101.

The public defender signed the document, and the court inquired if he read and
understood the rights he was waiving.

102.

The petitioner acknowledged to the court he understood the consequence of his
actions and received a factual basis from the City to support the guilty verdict.

103.

The defendant claims that the form was "partially completed", yet he fails to indicate
what portion of the form was not filled out and how that relates to ineffective
assistance of counsel.

104.

He has failed to cite to any legal points or authorities indicating to the court that such
a form would then be ineffective assistance prejudicing the defendant.

105.

The petitioner, in his amended motion, introduces a new claim that he was not aware
of possible defenses to the crimes for which he was charged and that his wife could
not be compelled to testify against him. See First Amended Petition at ^|3.

106.

Also, he claims that he was not aware of possible defense strategies such as a plea in
abeyance or different consequences between domestic violence-assault and domestic
violence-interruption with a communication device. See First Amended Petition at
13.

107.

However, it is not disputed that Mr. Lish met with the petitioner, and after
discussing the case with the defendant, asked the prosecutor if he would be willing
to make an offer.
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108.

The City stated that if the defendant plead guilty to the class B misdemeanor
Domestic Violence-Assault, punishable with a fine not to exceed $1,000 and a jail
sentence not to exceed 6 months, the City would then dismiss the second class B
misdemeanor Domestic Violence-Interruption with a communication device.

109.

This does not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel.

110.

First, accepting and advising a defendant to plead guilty to a reduce charge, and
thereby avoiding a harsher sentence, is a strategic decision that does not constitute
a basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Unites States v. Eisen. 974
F.2d 246, 265 (2nd Cir. 1992).

111.

Strategic decisions by trial counsel do not amount to ineffective assistance. Mitchell
v. Scully, 746 F.2d 951, 954-55 (2d Cir. 1984)(failing to inform defendant of an
available defense is not ineffective assistance where there was "exceedingly little
likelihood" that the defense would succeed and greater likelihood that it would
expose defendant to greater punishment than pleading guilty.)

112.

The defendant fails to include an affidavit by the public defender regarding meeting
with the defendant and what they talked about regarding his current situation.

113.

The defendant has failed to show that an actual "defense" to his crimes exists and
that the defense would likely succeed.

114.

Rather, he merely states that possible strategies were not discussed, such as a plea-inabeyance.

115.

The defendant request that this Court presuppose, absent an affidavit by Mr. Lish,
that such a topic should have been discussed and actually would have been obtained
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by the City.
116.

The defendant fails to state that the prosecution never offered a plea-in-abeyance at
the time of his arraignment, but rather, the City required the defendant to plead to the
Domestic Violence-Assault.

117.

The defendant request the court presuppose that had the petitioner and Mr. Lish
actually discussed the meaning and consequence of a plea-in-abeyance, such
discussion would have actually resulted in obtaining such a plea bargain and would
have been approved by the Court.

118.

Such broad stroked allegations and conclusions are insufficient for Post-Conviction
relief. Austin v. Delaware, 2002 Del. Sup. Lexis 535. (Austin claimed the that
counsel did not review any of the relevant and applicable principles of law and that
defense counsel failed to investigate the state's case.)

119.

Moreover, the point as to possible defense strategies, such as a plea-in-abeyance is
moot with regards to Mr. Lish because the prosecution never offered the defendant
that plea bargain.

120.

Furthermore, the defendant has claimed that there are differences between domestic
violence- assault and domestic violence-interruption of a communication devices.

121.

However, the defendant has failed to show to the court what exactly are the alleged
actual differences between the crimes.

122.

The defendant includes no statutes, case law, or explanation as to how these crimes
differ, if any, so as to justify ineffective assistance of counsel.

123.

Again, the defendant request this court to draw conclusion and results without
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showing how such differences of the crimes are ineffective assistance and how they
would prejudice the defendant.
124.

Furthermore, the issuance of Orem City providing legal funding to the public
defender is irrelevant and a speculative claim and the Court forthwith dismiss this
claim. The petitioner has not meet his burden to the court and has failed to point this
court to any legal authority or affidavit to consider.

125.

On the contrary, the defendant was obviously in a position to afford and retain private
counsel.

126.

Thus, the issue of providing proper legal funding is moot and irrelevant.

127.

Lastly, the petitioner alleges a new claim in his amended petition that he "was not
informed or aware of possible consequences of his plea, such as to his immigration
status" at the time Mr. Lish was appointed to represent the petitioner. See First
Amended Petition at p .

128.

The defendant cites to and argues the applicability of State v. Roias-Martinez. 2003
UTApp203,73P.3d967.

129.

In Rojas-Martinez, the defendant was charged with one count of sexual battery, a
class A misdemeanor. Prior to pleading guilty, the defendant's attorney advised the
defendant, a Mexican citizen, on the

issue of deportation.

Specifically, the

defendant's attorney advised him that he "might or might not" be deported. The
defendant then plead guilty and affirmatively responded that he understood his rights
at the plea hearing. Later, the defendant sought to timely withdraw his guilty plea
on the basis that his defense counsel affirmatively misrepresented the deportation
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consequences of the defendant's guilty plea.. The trial court denied his motion. The
defendant then appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals.
130.

The Court finds that the Utah Court of Appeals recognized that deportation is a
"collateral consequence" of a conviction. State v. Roias-Martinez, 2003 UT App
203, 73 P.3d 967; State v. McFadden, 884 P.2d 1303, 1303 (Utah App.
1994)(holding that possible deportation consequences, which in Utah are collateral
consequences, do not affect the voluntariness of the plea, hence, the trial court need
not instruct a defendant as to such deportation consequences prior to accepting the
guilty plea.).

131.

The Roias-Martinez Court pointed out, that based on McFadden. an attorneys failure
to inform a client of the deportation consequences of a guilty plea, without more,
does not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. State v. Roias-Martinez,
2003 UT App 203 fl9 73 P.3d 967.

132.

However, a commonly recognized exception to this rule exist when an attorney
affirmatively misrepresents deportation consequences to his or her client. Id at ^[8.

133.

The Utah Court of Appeals stated that because the 1996 amendments to the
Immigration and Nationality Act eliminated all discretion as to deportation of noncitizens convicted of aggravated felonies,(sexual battery is a crime that is considered
as an aggravated felony under the 8 U.S.C.A. §1101(a)(43)(2002)), the defendant's
guilty plea means virtually automatic, unavoidable deportation. Id at ^[9.

134.

The Court of Appeals held that since the defendant's attorney did admit to advising
his client that he "might or might not" be deported he affirmatively misrepresented
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to his client deportation consequences. Id at flO.
135.

However, in this case Rojas-Martinez does not even apply.

136.

In the defendant's own affidavit he states that "I was not informed nor was I aware
of the possible consequences of my plea, such as its effect on my immigration
status." See Affidavit of Raji Barbir %1\ First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief at Tf3.

137.

Such statements in Mr. Barbir's affidavit and Petition confirms that his defense
attorney, Randy Lish, did not advise, inform, or make aware of any possible
immigration consequences, such as deportation.

138.

Failure to advise, inform, or make aware of any collateral consequence, such as
possible deportation consequences, is clearly not ineffective assistance of counsel.
State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT App 203 f7, 73 P.3d 967(an attorneys failure to
inform a client of the deportation consequences of a guilty plea, without more, does
not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.)

139.

Therefore, again, the petitioner has failed to reach his burden of proof for showing
ineffective assistance of counsel by Mr. Lish.

140.

The petitioner does allege that his second attorney, Mr. Kawai, improperly advised
him of the possible deportation consequences.

141.

The Court reasserts its position that the petitioner request the Court to "second guess"
his discussions with Mr. Kawai 30 days after the guilty plea.

142.

The petitioner has failed to indicate why Mr. Kawai's affidavit is not included nor
what reasonable efforts he used to procure the affidavit of Mr. Kawai. Therefore,
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without more the Court is not going to second-guess the discussions between the
attorney and the petitioner.
143.

Therefore, in reviewing the entire petition on a whole, the petitioner has made "overbroad and generalized accusations, which are wholly conclusary, which do not
support entitlement of relief' under the post-conviction remedies act.

Austin v.

Delaware, 2002 Del. Super. LEXIS 535: See Younger v. State. 580 A.2d 552. 554
(Del. 1990).
144.

His claims are void of substance and merit as to all claims listed in his petition.

145.

Such arguments fail to meet the burden as required by Rule 65C for a showing of
ineffective assistance of counsel which requires that the defendant identify the acts
or omissions which, under the circumstances, show that counsel's representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness, that counsel's performance was
deficient, and the defendant was prejudice. State v. Gardner, 844 P.2d 293. 297
(Utah 1992).
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ORDER
The Court, having reviewed defendant's petition for relief under the post-conviction remedies
act and the City's objection thereto, hereby DENIES and DISMISSES the Defendant's petition for
relief under the post-conviction remedies act on the basis that it is apparent to the Court that the
petitioner's claims appear frivolous on its face, the facts alleged in the petition do not support a claim
for relief as a matter of law, and/or have no arguable basis in fact. The Court hereby summarily
dismisses the Petition Pursuant to the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65(C)(g)(l). IT IS SO
ORDERED.
DATED this 1/

i
day of

2003.
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT

!4
^he Honorable John C. Backlund
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed/Hand delivered a true and correct copy of the finding of facts
and conclusions regarding the above-named defendant to:
Jack H. Molgard
Attorney for the Petitioner
102 South 100 West
P.O. BOX 461
Brigham City, Utah 84302

this ^

day of

S t f l f e W . W , 2003.

WHOM
Orem City Attorney's Office
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